



Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft

Author(s): Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin

Source: *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities (Winter, 2005/2006), pp. 39-59

Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian International Council

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204128>

Accessed: 10-07-2018 16:23 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://about.jstor.org/terms>



Sage Publications, Ltd., Canadian International Council are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *International Journal*

Eylem Yilmaz and Pinar Bilgin

Constructing Turkey's "western" identity during the Cold War

Discourses of the intellectuals of statecraft

Throughout the republican era, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions has provided Turkey's policymakers with the opportunity to assert the country's "western" identity. Indeed, Turkey's "westernness" has been expressed, not only through the adoption of ideas and manners from the west (as happened in Ottoman times), but also through joining western institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is one of the reasons why the US project of promoting democracy in the greater Middle East is received with enthusiasm by some in Ankara. Notwithstanding the concerns of those who worry that taking an active part in this project would undermine the carefully constructed role Islam plays in shaping political processes in Turkey, others seem to consider this scheme an opportunity to entrench Turkey's position within NATO and (re)assert its western identity.¹

Eylem Yilmaz holds an MA in international relations from Bilkent University. Pinar Bilgin is assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. The authors would like to acknowledge financial support provided by the department of international relations at Bilkent University and to thank Ümit Cizre and Bilge Criss for their helpful comments.

¹ "Sezer'in 'İlimli İslam' Tepkisi" [Sezer's reaction to "moderate Islam"], *Milliyet*, 15 April 2004; and "Türkiye'nin Degeri 2004'te Artacak" [Turkey's value will increase in 2004], *Milliyet*, 23 February 2004.

Leaving aside the somewhat paradoxical nature of seeking to assert western identity through posing as a model for the Middle East, what should be emphasized here is the first premise of this article: that state identity in Turkey and elsewhere “is always potentially precarious, it needs constantly to be stabilized or (re)produced.”² It is through the representational practices of state and nonstate actors (including policymakers, scholars, and journalists) that state identity is produced and/or reproduced. Such representational practices include state officials’ discourses on a particular foreign policy issue, scholarly writings on lands far away, writings and speeches of policy makers and journalists, geopolitical discourses of myriad actors, and even popular film.³

A second premise of the article is that what makes foreign policy (i.e., relations between states) possible is a political practice that makes certain events and actors “foreign,” that is, the politics of exclusion and inclusion, processes of constituting particular objects as part of “them” (foreign), and other objects as part of “us.” Viewed as such, representational practices constitute a significant component of the process of making something foreign. Foreign policy practices of states, in turn, “reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by [the foreign policy practices of states] and...contain challenges to the identity which results.”⁴ Stated with reference to Turkey’s case, representational practices of various actors have constructed Turkey’s identity as western as opposed to eastern. After defining itself and others, Turkey’s foreign policy has been conducted upon these specific actors. Such diplomatic conduct, in turn, has helped to (re)produce Turkey’s western identity and has sustained a pro-western orientation.

2 Jutta Weldes, “The cultural production of crises: US identity and missiles in Cuba,” in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 59.

3 See, for example, Weldes, “The cultural production of crises,” 35-62; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979); Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 1998), and Weldes, “Going cultural: *Star Trek*, state action and popular culture,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 28: 1 (1999): 117-34.

4 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 76.

The significance of NATO membership to Turkey's claim to belong to the west cannot be overemphasized. The efforts of Turkish policymakers to locate Turkey in the west as opposed to non-west can be traced back to the early republican era when westernization became one of the cornerstones of Kemal Atatürk's foreign and domestic policies. In the aftermath of the Second World War, this policy was pursued through the search for US assistance (which came in the form of the Truman doctrine in 1947) and its institutionalization in the form of NATO membership. Later still, Turkey began to pursue membership in the European Economic Community, now the European Union, a goal that is still a keystone of the country's foreign policy.

Joining NATO in the early Cold War era proved difficult not least because of considerable suspicion regarding Turkey's commitment to western security—a suspicion that was raised by Ankara's decision to remain outside the Second World War. Although that decision had served Turkey's purpose at the time, it was not without ramifications for its postwar relations. Writing in 1947, five years before it acceded to the Atlantic alliance, Ambassador Cevat Açıkalın sought to offset such suspicions by reminding the readers of *International Affairs*, the flagship journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, of the country's contribution to the allied war effort:

[A]t a moment when the Allies were in great difficulties, Turkey played the role of a temporary shield behind which the Russians and the British were able to use their forces more freely against the aggressors in various theatres of operations.⁵

Accordingly, Ankara's decision to send troops to Korea and various attempts to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain in the setting up of a regional security organization in the Middle East could all be considered attempts to reestablish Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner. This was underscored by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft who, through their writings, pointed to Turkey's contribution to western security, thereby helping to locate their country firmly in the west. During the Cold War, representations of Turkey as a "junior partner" of the United States in the fight against communism helped to produce and reproduce its western identity, which was perceived to be very precarious at the time.

⁵ Cevat Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations," *International Affairs* 23:4 (1947): 485.

By looking at the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, this article seeks to point to how their representational practices contributed to Turkey's western identity throughout the Cold War. Intellectuals of statecraft are understood as those formal theorists and practitioners who have participated in the discursive construction of state identity through their writings on the foreign and security policy problems faced by the government of the day. Although it is "state officials who are granted the right, who have the authority, to define security and insecurity...they are often assisted by what have been called 'intellectuals of statecraft.' Less influential than state officials, their representational practices are nevertheless powerful—by virtue of their expertise on foreign and security policy issues—in that they enjoy the power to define and thus to constitute the world."⁶ In other words, these intellectuals do not often directly shape foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state, but they contribute to the shaping of the foreign and security agenda through defining what is and is not a security problem.

The argument this article seeks to introduce is that through their writings on Turkey's membership within NATO as a western institution, Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft did not merely describe their country's Cold War search for security. They also participated in the construction of Turkey's western identity. Such writings are never politically neutral; they help to constitute the world in their own image. Yet, at the same time, the authors deny their works' interpretative status, for they "claim to re-present effortlessly the drama of international politics as an intelligible spectacle without interpretation."⁷ For example, the editor of the Ankara journal *Foreign Policy* maintains that this publication provides "objective analysis of foreign policy issues both to Turkish and foreign readers."⁸ This statement, in itself, constitutes a good example of what is being problematized

6 The term "intellectuals of statecraft" is from Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy," *Political Geography* 11: 2 (1992): 190-204.

7 Tuathail and Dalby, "Introduction: Rethinking geopolitics, towards a critical geopolitics," in Tuathail and Dalby, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics*, 6.

8 Seyfi Taşhan, "Foreign Policy Institute, its 25th anniversary," in *Bulletin for the 25th Anniversary of the Foreign Policy Institute* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1999). Seyfi Taşhan is the founding president of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute and the editor of the journal *Foreign Policy*.

here—that is, the claim to represent the world as seen through the ostensibly objective lenses of the security intellectual. By way of analyzing the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, this article seeks to point to the "self-constituting politics"⁹ of such writings. That is to say, the aim here is not to uncover what individual experts really believed or to decipher their real intentions, but to point to how these texts are "linked with a wide array of discourses and representational practices"¹⁰ that contributed to the (re)production of Turkey's western identity during that era. It is this identity that enabled a pro-western foreign policy during the Cold War and helped justify Turkey remaining within NATO even after the USSR retreated from its early demands (which included the return of two of Turkey's eastern provinces and granting of bases on the Turkish Straits), or during détente (when there was greater room for manoeuvre for smaller states, such as Turkey).

A caveat is in order: the texts looked at for the purposes of this article are articles published in the quarterly journal *Dış Politika/Foreign Policy*, the in-house journal of the Foreign Policy Institute, which is Turkey's oldest independent think tank specializing on foreign and security policy issues.¹¹ *Foreign Policy* is the second oldest journal in Turkey specializing in international affairs. We chose to look at *Foreign Policy* as opposed to the oldest journal, the annual *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, because the *Yearbook* only publishes the works of academics, whereas contributors to *Foreign Policy* have, over the years, included ministers of foreign affairs, diplomats, bureaucrats, and military officials, as well as scholars of political science, international relations and economics. The articles published in the journal are thus more representative of the views of the country's intellectuals of statecraft. The articles examined in this paper were published after 1974, when the journal began, and in the aftermath of the crisis created by the US military embargo. In that political context, the importance to Turkey of membership in NATO could not be taken for granted and had to be defended. Our conclusions, therefore, are limited to the post-1974 era. We have not attempted to point to any continuities

9 Ó Tuathail and Dalby, "Introduction," in Tuathail and Dalby, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics*, 1.

10 Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, 147.

11 See *30 Years of Foreign Policy: A Summary of the Work of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute and Its Publications, 1974-2004* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004).

or discontinuities with the early years of the Cold War, when there was less domestic criticism of the relationship with NATO and the United States, or with the post-Cold War era. What is more interesting for the purpose of this article is to examine how Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft chose to represent issues related to the country's security at a time when membership in NATO and a close alliance with the US were under considerable domestic criticism.

In what follows, an analysis of the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft is presented to make two interrelated points. First, in these writings, NATO was represented not only as a military, but also as a *cultural* organization manifesting a western identity. This, in turn, contributed to the discursive (re)production of Turkey's western identity. Second, this tendency played a significant role in the self-perception of Turkey as a modern and democratic western state, as distinct from the "non-western," "traditional," "underdeveloped," or "non-democratic" states of the eastern bloc. The Cold War insecurity that Turkey was settled within was not an objective and natural situation, but a social and cultural production. The country's intellectuals of statecraft did not merely describe Ankara's Cold War search for security, but also contributed to the production and reproduction of its state identity as western, which, in turn, constituted a cornerstone of Turkey's pro-western security policies. The focal points of this article are, therefore, the "representations of danger"¹² in the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft; how they shared a common discourse during the Cold War; and the ways in which politics of representation were instrumental in (re)inscribing westernness into Turkey's identity.

NATO AS A CULTURAL ALLIANCE

NATO was formed after the Second World War as a collective defence organization. In 1952, Turkey joined the Atlantic alliance, serving in the southern flank as a counterweight to the Soviet threat. As well as helping to secure Turkey against Soviet expansionism, the country's membership in NATO has also constituted one of the milestones in the multifaceted efforts to locate Turkey in the west. As Ali Karaosmanoglu has argued,

beyond the Soviet threat after the Second World War, Turkey's decisiveness in joining NATO derived mostly from a profound belief in

¹² Campbell, *Writing Security*.

Western values and in the virtues of Western political systems. NATO membership solidified Ankara's Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link with the West.¹³

The central point of this passage is that by promoting the alliance as the champion of western strategic identity, Turkey's policy makers added a *cultural* dimension to NATO. Identifying a cultural dimension to NATO membership is not to suggest that Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft were alone in doing so. On the contrary, as Michael Williams and Iver Neumann have shown, various Cold War narratives on NATO portrayed the organization as the "military guarantor of Western civilization," the coherence of which rested upon not only resisting the common Soviet threat, but also on cultural and civilizational ties.¹⁴ Indeed, NATO's narrative included "[c]laims about the cultural and political nature of the Alliance."¹⁵ It is a point presented clearly in the preamble of the Washington treaty (1949), in which the signatories described themselves as "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of other peoples, founded upon principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."¹⁶ As Williams and Neumann have maintained, NATO was represented as the manifestation of a broad cultural context uniting member-states who shared common cultural and normative traits. As a result, NATO did not merely function as a collective defence organization but also helped to constitute its members' particular identities by marking their differences from those states that belonged to the east. Viewed as such, Turkey was one of many NATO member-states that (re)produced their western identity

13 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* 54: 1 (2000): 209.

14 Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, "From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia and the power of identity," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29:2 (2000): 361. This is not meant to de-emphasize the role played by the Soviet threat in the formation of NATO. Rather, the point is that NATO, once formed, was kept together, not only by means of threat politics (i.e. with reference to Soviet expansionist tendencies), but also through resort to various representational practices that emphasized the cultural ties. See, for example, "Report of the committee of the three on nonmilitary cooperation in NATO," (approved by the North Atlantic Council in December 1956), www.nato.int.

15 Williams and Neumann, "From alliance to security community," 367.

16 NATO, "North Atlantic treaty," Brussels, 1949, www.nato.int.

through underlining differences with non-members. The Cold War was represented as a conflict not only between the two superpowers, but one encompassing broader “groupings of states...the ‘West’ and the ‘East’.” It was through interaction of the two sides and representations of these interactions that the identities and threats to these identities were defined. It was the “ordering of terms, meanings, and practices” that established and maintained the categories of friend/enemy, west/east and communist/democratic,¹⁷ and reinforced the confrontational relationship that was the Cold War.

JOINING THE WEST THROUGH THE KOREAN WAR EFFORT

Along with other Western states, Turkey sent troops to support the United Nations effort in Korea (1950-53), which became the battleground between the east and the west. As was mentioned earlier, the intervention was not merely a military operation but was also “a cultural process of collective identity formation.”¹⁸ With hindsight, it has become a symbolic act that helped to constitute western collective identity in opposition to the socialist other(s) in the east. Writing more than three decades after the event, Yulug Tekin Kurat chose to represent Turkey’s participation in the Korean War in the following terms:

[T]he prominent members of the Turkish government...decided to take part in the Korean War. In the first place Turkey had taken such a decision in response to the appeal of the United Nations to safeguard the integrity and independence of South Korea in accordance with the principles of the [UN] Charter.... But behind this decision Turkish aspirations for joining the Atlantic Alliance were also in mind. It was because the theatre of war in Korea prepared the ground for the Turkish forces to set an example for their fighting ability with the up to date weapons.¹⁹

17 Jennifer Milliken, “Intervention and identity: Reconstructing the west in Korea,” in Weldes et al., eds., *Cultures of Insecurity*, 92.

18 Ibid., 91.

19 Yulug Tekin Kurat, “Turkey’s entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” *Foreign Policy* 10: 3-4 (1983): 74. See also Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye’nin NATO Üyeligini Hızlandıran İki Önemli Faktör: Kore Savaşı ve ABD Büyükelçisi George McGhee,” [Two factors that precipitated Turkey’s membership in NATO: The Korean War and US Ambassador George McGhee], *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 18: 1/2 (1991): 1-35.

These words point to two "logics of appropriateness"²⁰ for Turkey's participation in the Korean War. First, defending the independence of a sovereign state is presented as the appropriate behaviour for a member of the United Nations, since complying with the stipulations of the UN Charter is the relevant norm. As a member of the UN, Turkey's external behaviour can, therefore, be considered to have been constrained by the normative structure of the UN system. Furthermore, Turkey's interests and identity were, it is argued, informed by the widely held international norms of the UN, which guided the state along certain socially prescribed channels of what is considered "appropriate" state behaviour. Accordingly, for Kurat, Turkey's reason for participation in the Korean intervention is represented as an attempt to secure its identity as a respectable member of the international community represented by the UN.

The same logic is observed in an article by Haluk Bayülken, former representative of Turkey to the UN (1969-1971), where he noted that his country advocated "the supremacy of the principle of sovereign equality of all peace loving states," which constituted the basis of the UN Charter and that it "has never lost her faith in the ideals and principles of the Charter." Ambassador Bayülken went on to justify Turkey's joining the Korean War effort with reference to its identity as a "reliable" UN member state:

[t]his belief of Turkey in the ideals embodied in the Charter was a major factor deciding Turkey's position in the Korean War.... It was the adaptation of...[the UN] resolution which enabled the United Nations to send forces to Korea.²¹

In this way, Bayülken explained Turkey's military participation on the grounds that there had been "an act of aggression" and a "breach of peace" in Korea, which necessitated UN intervention.

Equally interesting, the second "logic of appropriateness" observed in the passage from the article by Kurat quoted above is that Turkey's participation in the Korean War was represented as appropriate conduct for a

20 On the "logic of appropriateness," see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52: 4 (1998): 887-917.

21 Ü. Haluk Bayülken, "Turkey and the United Nations," *Foreign Policy* 1: 3 (1971): 100-103.

western state. Writing in the late 1970s, Professor Metin Tamkoç represented the decision as,

an opportunity for [President] Bayar to demonstrate his strong desire for solidarity within the West. He decided to send a contingent of 5,000 troops to Korea. The immediate dividend of this investment was the association of Turkey with NATO.²²

It is interesting to note that almost three decades after the Korean War a discourse of 'duties' was employed to explain why Turkey sent troops to Korea. In doing this, Turkey's action was represented as that of a state that adhered to principles of sovereign equality, collective security and international justice. In Tamkoç's analysis, these were interpreted as norms constitutive of the west. Accordingly, sending troops to Korea was considered as not only a military strategic decision but also as a symbolic act demonstrating Turkey's dedication to international law and western norms. In another article published in 1974 by Turan Güneş, the foreign minister at the time, NATO membership itself was also represented as signifying commitment to western values such as "democracy, respect for human rights, social progress and justice."²³ In the writings of the intellectuals of statecraft, Turkey was represented as pursuing a policy consistent with the policies of other western states by virtue of its support for the UN operation in Korea. By participating in the Korean War, Turkey was considered to have acted in conformity with the norms constitutive of a western state identity.

THE SOVIET UNION AS TURKEY'S "OTHER"

In 1945, the USSR made three demands on Turkey in return for renewing the Turco-Soviet friendship pact of 1925. These were the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union, granting of bases on the Turkish Straits, and the revision of the Montreux convention (1936) to enable greater Soviet control over the sea traffic in and out of the Black Sea. In the scholarly literature on Turkish foreign policy, the relatively tense relations between Turkey and the USSR in the immediate postwar era, the

²² Metin Tamkoç, "The impact of the Truman doctrine on the national security interests of Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 6: 3/4 (1977): 29.

²³ Turan Güneş, "Changing world conditions, NATO and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 9:1 (1974): 65.

promulgation of the Truman doctrine (1947), and the subsequent application of Turkey to join NATO are mostly associated with these demands on Turkish territories.²⁴ In the writings of Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, however the Soviet threat was extended further back in history and has been presented a foundational threat to the Turkish republic. Consider the following excerpt from an analysis of the Truman doctrine published in 1977:

Ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish leaders Atatürk and İnönü had considered the Turco-Soviet relations as the bedrock of Turkish foreign policy. Ever mindful of the territorial designs of the Soviets on Turkey and the Soviet drive toward the Mediterranean and Middle East, Atatürk and İnönü saw to it that Turkey did not remain isolated against the Soviet Union. To that end they established friendly relations with the major powers of Europe.²⁵

The author's words trace the history of strained relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey back to the early years of the modern republic.

This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union was not considered a threat to Turkey's security in the early republican era by the policymakers at that time. The issue here is not whether the USSR constituted a foundational threat or not. More important is the fact that it was represented as such by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft long after the events that gave rise to the perception of a threat, and that this threat was read backwards into the history predating the events described in those writings. In this vein, consider the following excerpt from an article by General Necip Torumtay, where the author directly links Turkish-Soviet relations during earlier periods with the Turkish decision to join NATO:

24 In 1949, and again in 1950, Turkey's policymakers informed the US and British ambassadors in Ankara of their desire to join NATO. This is not to underestimate the role domestic factors played in shaping the decision to join NATO. See, e.g., A. Halûk Ülman and Oral Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968)—II," [Factors shaping Turkish foreign policy (1923-68)—II], *A.Ü.S.B.F. Dergisi* (1972): 1-24; and Faruk Sönmezoglu, "II. Dünya Savaşı Döneminde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası: "Tarafsızlık"tan NATO'ya" [Turkey's foreign policy during the Second World War: From "neutrality" to NATO], in Faruk Sönmezoglu, ed., *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* [Analysis of Turkish foreign policy] (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), 79-89.

25 Tamkoç, "The impact of the Truman doctrine," 19.

[the] Soviet Union's refusal to renew the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925, the tension caused by demands on the Turkish Straits and territorial claims from Eastern Anatolia immediately after World War II and the ensuing defense requirements required Turkey to look for new arrangements for its security apart from neutrality. This quest has (sic) ended in 1952 when Turkey joined NATO.²⁶

It is interesting to note here that such parallels with the pre-Cold War period were not drawn in the early years of the Cold War. Take, for example, the article cited earlier by Açıkalın, in which the author pointed to Turkey's contributions to the Allies' war effort. In that article, published in 1947, the author chose to represent the Soviet demands on Turkey's territories as reactions to Ankara's decision to remain outside the Second World War and not necessarily as an instance of historical Soviet enmity against Turkey.²⁷

Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft maintained this discourse of the early-Cold War years during the early 1970s, an era characterized by the emergence of *détente* in east-west relations. Despite this, writing in 1974, Admiral Sezai Orkunt emphasized the continuity of Turkey's policy towards the Soviet Union. He wrote:

Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of the Soviet demand for military bases on the Turkish Straits. This demand is one that would entirely destroy Turkish independence. There is, as yet, no change in the conditions to lead Turkey to think otherwise.²⁸

Here, the territorial demands of the Soviets are represented as the major reason behind Turkey's initial request for cooperation with the western states and NATO. These demands are understood as not merely territorial demands but as threats to Turkish independence and the author, a senior military officer, argued that the conditions that were present at the outset of the Cold War continued into the 1970s. Ambassador Muharrem

26 Necip Torumtay, "Turkey's military doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 15:1/2 (1991): 20.

27 See Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations."

28 Sezai Orkunt, "The interalliance relationship and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 4: 1 (1974): 87. See also Bayülken, "Turkey and the United Nations," 99.

Nuri Birgi expressed the continuing immanence of the Soviet threat in equally certain terms:

the frightening scale of increase in Soviet arms, their establishments of naval superiority in all areas...their activities for creating division among the allies and...for destroying every one of them...should be considered as evidences...that the danger of Soviet invasion is [not] over.²⁹

Without wanting to read too much into the author's words, it is worth noting here that while the article was published during the era of détente, it was also a time of increasing tension in Turkey's relations with its western allies due to the Cyprus problem—that is, at a time when Turkey's decision to remain within NATO required justification.

Given the historical juncture at which they were published, such writings constituted attempts to uphold a particular narrative about the "other" (i.e., the Soviet Union) in order to sustain a particular account of the "self" (i.e., Turkey). As Thomas Banchoff argues, "[t]hrough narratives, the roots of a state's relations with other states and institutions and their present situations are depicted. In this manner, the narrative defines 'who we are' by way of articulating 'where we have been'."³⁰ To uphold a narrative means to sustain a particular account of the self. Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft chose to locate the enduring character of Turkey's westernness with reference to the "enduring" threat posed by the USSR. So long as this narrative made sense, this identity could be sustained in the public domain. It might even be argued—although it can never be proven—that without reference to the threat from the east, locating Turkey in the west would have been more difficult, notwithstanding the commitment of the Kemalist elite to Turkey's westernisation. The perpetuation of the master narrative of the Cold War—that represented the Soviet Union as the other—helped to (re)produce Turkey's western identity. It also justified, in part, Turkey's continuing cooperation with the west even when Ankara's relations with its NATO allies deteriorated, such as after the arms embargo imposed by the

29 Muharrem Nuri Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic community and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 3:4 (1973): 73.

30 Thomas Banchoff, "German identity and European integration," *European Journal of International Relations* 5: 3 (1999): 270.

United States in the 1970s, or when relations with the USSR improved as happened during détente.

NATO AS A COMMUNITY OF VALUES

In the pages of an important journal such as *Foreign Policy*, NATO was represented not merely as a defensive alliance but also as a cultural alliance, a community that manifested the common values shared by its members. Consider the following excerpt from an article by Kamran Inan, a former ambassador and member of the Turkish national assembly, published in 1974:

Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in our westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say within the Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin from Eastern Turkey. In the context of our historical development, this constitutes an important achievement and a milestone. In this world of ours that has been made smaller due to advances in...technology, nations are compelled to come together and form solidarity groups.... [T]he countries which have similar political systems, and close values and views of life and common interests [sic] generally come together. The cooperation...grows in time and creates an atmosphere of community. This has been the case in NATO.³¹

Here, NATO is presented as a community, membership in which is considered a cultural as well as a military undertaking. Aside from recognizing NATO's military role, the author has emphasized the important political nature of the organization. Such a view was not uncommon. One sees a similar perspective in an article by Osman Olcay, the minister of foreign affairs at the time of its publication:

[A]ny analysis of our relations with the Western countries should...take into account the traditional aspects of these relations which are rooted in our historical evolution in the economic, political and military fields reflecting our treaty commitments, the requirements of our geographical locations and our way of life and

³¹ Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 72.

democratic purposes.... The North Atlantic Alliance constitutes a framework which provides the means for conducting our cooperation with the Western countries in the areas of security and foreign policy in an effective way and on the basis of mutual respect and interests.³²

Likewise, writing in 1977, Ambassador Ismail Soysal underlined how NATO membership signified Turkey's place in western civilization.³³

Turkish authors made the connection between NATO and the west because the alliance was viewed as representing common cultural and normative traits rooted in "democracy and respect of human rights, social progress and justice."³⁴ Turan Güneş identified what he saw as core NATO values, such as dedication to western ideals, democracy, human rights, social progress and rule of law. In a sense, Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft presented NATO membership not merely as membership in a collective defence organization but as a means of political identification. That is, membership in the alliance was viewed as proof of the commonalities among the western Allies in terms of behavioural traits as well as values. As such, NATO is conceived not merely as a military alliance standing against the Soviet threat, but also as an instrument of western civilization. Against the backdrop of the Soviet threat, NATO membership assisted the modern Republic of Turkey in locating itself firmly in the west in general and in Europe in particular.

TURKEY'S COLD WAR IDENTITY: ROLE CONSTRUCTIONS

An analysis of statements by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft ascribing to Turkey a particular role identity in opposition to the Soviet Union's counter-role shows how Ankara's role within NATO shaped foreign policy. Consider, for example another excerpt from the article by Inan:

Turkey has occupied an important role [in NATO] and made important contributions [to peace as a deterrent force]. If Turkey today is represented at the European Security and Cooperation

32 Osman Olcay, "Turkey's foreign policy," *Foreign Policy* 1:2 (1971): 80.

33 Ismail Soysal, "The influence of the concept of western civilization on Turkish foreign policy," *Foreign Policy* 6: 3/4 (1977): 3-6.

34 Turan Güneş, "Changing world conditions, NATO, and Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 4: 1 (1974): 65.

Conference in Geneva, and at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Conference in Vienna and has a word in these conferences and gained the opportunity to defend its national interests, this is the result of our membership in NATO.

Our collaboration in the military field has been to the advantage of all parties and has proved to be beneficial for peace. The determination and decision of all powers to react jointly against common danger has preserved peace and has created the most powerful deterrent force in the world.³⁵

NATO membership, he argued, did not only grant Turkey a say in international forums, but also rendered it an indispensable partner for the protection of peace.³⁶

This concern with the projection of strength is not only directed beyond Turkey's border; there is also a domestic component. Turkey is no longer viewed, as it was not so long ago, as "[t]he sick man of Europe" but as a strong and dependable power in the west, which can only make the Turks proud. The Kemalist objective of rescuing Turkey and the Turkish people from history has been accomplished, according to this author, and the republic is understood as a positive influence in global affairs—no longer simply subject to the will of other governments, but an actor of note in itself. The author sought to substantiate this argument by maintaining that "we have contributed to the preservation of peace, and we have played a constructive role."³⁷ Admiral Güven Erkaya concurred: "Turkey is proud of the role she has been playing in NATO for the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe in the last forty years."³⁸ By the same token, Admiral Orkunt argued that, by means of the secure border Ankara maintained in the face of Soviet expansionism, and as an "advance warning and alarm platform," Turkey contributed even more tangibly to the protection of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus the western world.³⁹ These

35 Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 73.

36 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46: 2 (1993): 400.

37 Inan, "Turkey and NATO," 71, 77.

38 Güven Erkaya, "Turkey's defense requirements in the 1990s," *Foreign Policy* 15: 1/2 (1991): 31.

39 Sezai Orkunt, "The interalliance relationship and Turkey," 89.

arguments were presented by the intellectuals of statecraft as the reasons why Turkey should be considered a significant ally whose contributions deserved recognition.

Other intellectuals of statecraft have also drawn attention to Turkey's presence in international politics as a result of its alignment with the west and membership in NATO. Necdet Tezel, emphasized the material (i.e., military and geographical) dimension of Turkey's contributions to its role within NATO. In an address delivered when he was the undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1985-86), he noted that

Among the Western European countries Turkey has the largest area. We are one of the five most populated Western European countries. Turkey has the largest army in NATO after the United States and the largest frontiers with the Warsaw pact among all the NATO members.

Turkey's ability to ensure an effective defense in southern flank of NATO and to continue to play the important role as an element of stability in the region is closely connected with the rapid development of her economic and military capabilities. Turkey is spending great efforts in these fields.

Turkey spends from her budget each year large sums for defense purposes. We are among the leading countries in NATO with respect to the share of defense expenditures in the budget and in the gross national product.⁴⁰

Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Ambassador Engin Oba shared a similar view: "Turkey has played a pivotal role in NATO and in the defense of Europe and the Middle East."⁴¹ Such perspectives stressed Turkey's "unique qualities" in the military field defined in terms of Turkey's "pivotal role" as an "element of stability"—politically appealing, yet vague, expressions. The multiple references to the military dimension of the country's role within NATO pointed to Turkey's great responsibility for

40 Necdet Tezel, "Opening speech in the seminar on eastern Mediterranean security: NATO perspectives," *Foreign Policy* 13: 1/2 (1986): 6.

41 Engin Oba, "Turkey and western European security in the new era of international relations: A political and sociological appraisal," *Foreign Policy* 17:1/2 (1993): 54.

security on the southern flank. Ankara's disproportionately large defence expenditure, given the size of the national economy relative to other NATO allies, and as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), was being presented by the authors as yet more evidence of Turkey's commitment and contribution to the alliance.

In another article, published in 1986 when the Cold War was already winding down, Turkey's geographical location is identified as a significant element in according Turkey a special role within the alliance. Its author, General Ihsan Gürkan, represented Turkey "as the most critical NATO country in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe."⁴² The merits brought by Turkey's membership were further presented by the founding president of the Foreign Policy Institute and editor of *Foreign Policy* as follows: "Turkey's place within the Alliance makes supply routes to Soviet client states in Africa and the Middle East insecure."⁴³ As always, however, alliance membership is understood in terms of its contribution to Turkey's national identity. This persisted even after the USSR had disappeared from the world stage.

The basic requirement, which was represented also as the prerequisite of Turkish foreign policy, was expressed as catching up with the western level of development in the technological, industrial, commercial, and cultural fields. With reference to Turkey's role in NATO, Ambassador Muharrem Nuri Birgi, in a 1993 article, maintained that

[t]o become part of the community formed by the developed members of the Atlantic Community, which is the brain and main source of the present civilization where technology, industry, commerce and culture play an extremely important role, requires an early approach to their level of development. Otherwise, there are bound to be differences between us, and the effects of these differences will be felt at the most unexpected moments.⁴⁴

42 Ihsan Gürkan, "Security environment in the Mediterranean," *Foreign Policy* 13: 1/2 (1986): 32.

43 Seyfi Taşhan, "Turkey's relations with the USA and possible future developments," *Foreign Policy*, 8: 1/2 (1980): 22.

44 Birgi, "Developments within the Atlantic community," 76. See also Soysal, "The influence of the concept of western civilisation," 3.

Such a message comes out more clearly in the following excerpt from an article by Soysal:

Turkey's participation in the Council of Europe in 1949 and in NATO in 1952 are concrete steps in the...direction [of establishing Turkey in the Western civilization and democratic order]. With these treaties Turkey has undertaken a number of moral commitments which have to be fulfilled in domestic policies as well as in foreign policy.⁴⁵

It is worth noting that both authors' words were seemingly addressed to a domestic audience, reminding them of the need to conform to western standards. (Similar arguments underpin the current pursuit of membership in the European Union.) That is to say, Turkey's role within NATO, according to Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft, has shaped both its domestic as well as foreign policies.

What all these statements share in common is that they employed a language of commitments, duties, functions, and responsibilities that indicated expectations of a certain kind of foreign policy behaviour. Turkey's role was defined by these writers primarily as both an ally and a promoter of security that emphasized military capabilities and responsibilities. In this sense, Turkey occupied a position within the social normative structure of NATO, as the intellectuals of statecraft conceived it, that entailed particular "behavioral norms toward others possessing relevant counter-identities."⁴⁶ Such representations of the Soviet threat in various writings on foreign policy served to locate Turkey in the west, which, in turn, helped to sustain a pro-western foreign policy during times of crisis (as with Cyprus in 1967 and 1974) and later during the period of détente.

CONCLUSION

It is reasonable to assume that the discourses employed by Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft in the pages of *Foreign Policy* have contributed to the construction and maintenance of Turkey's western identity during the Cold War. It could be surmised that, by employing a standardized discourse on

⁴⁵ Soysal, "The influence of the concept of western civilization," 6.

⁴⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 227.

NATO, a specific understanding of Turkey's identity was internalized and institutionalised that, in turn, constituted a guide for diplomatic conduct. Such representational practices helped to construct Turkey's state identity in the first place with reference to its association with the west and its differences from the east. After defining the self and other(s), Turkish foreign policy toward these actors was shaped accordingly. In an active process of interpretation, Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft did not only paint a particular picture of what they saw, but also helped to (re)produce Turkey's western identity. If this argument is correct, they helped to sustain and legitimize a pro-western foreign policy and Turkey's membership to NATO even after the Soviet threat of the immediate post-war period lost its immediacy.

It is difficult to know the degree to which the intellectuals of statecraft, whose voices were heard through the medium of *Foreign Policy* were able to influence actual foreign policy making in Turkey. In one sense, this was not what they primarily aimed for. Although the Foreign Policy Institute was established as a think tank to provide intellectual back up to foreign policy making in Turkey, its primary aim, as stated by its core members, has been to shape public opinion:

What is important is that public debate focuses on the issue at hand and public opinion is formed, indeed, guided by the FPI pronouncements and publications. This is the measure of the effectiveness of a think-tank that we can refer to in our assessments. In this regard, we feel that FPI has excelled.⁴⁷

Stated as such, the Foreign Policy Institute's criteria for excellence, that of shaping public opinion in line with the existing line of policymaking, is even more difficult to measure than its influence on actual policymaking. Having said that, the evidence presented in this article has revealed that the contributors to *Foreign Policy* also seemed very interested in providing support to existing policymaking. This comes out clearly in their writings on the enduring Soviet threat that were published during the détente era, or those writings that stressed Turkey's contributions to the Atlantic alliance at

47 Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Ersin Onulduran, "Seyfi Taşhan, Foreign Policy Institute and the genesis of think-tank culture in Turkey," in *Contemporary Issues in International Politics: Essays in Honour of Seyfi Taşhan* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), 3.

a time when public opinion grew critical of ties with the west in general and the United States in particular. While further research is obviously required, it can be hypothesized that Turkey's intellectuals of statecraft contributed to sustaining a pro-western foreign policy, and that they were an indirect yet nevertheless significant influence on foreign policy making in Turkey.

Finally, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that an analysis of texts by the intellectuals of statecraft of Turkey's bid to join the European Union will likely produce a similar conclusion, for throughout the republican era, the issue of membership in western institutions has witnessed the intellectuals of statecraft articulating Turkey's western identity as well as insecurities and interests.⁴⁸ Although the role played today by the intellectuals of statecraft remains unchanged, an increase in the public's interest in foreign and security policy issues has meant a new challenge to the authority of their writings. Recently, new actors in Turkey's developing civil society have become more willing to speak about issues of foreign and security policy—areas that had previously been a preserve of the intellectuals of statecraft. This is not only due to an increase in the business elite's interest in foreign and security policy,⁴⁹ but is also due to the process of globalization, which has empowered nongovernmental actors in general. The emergence of an alternative security discourse employed by these new actors suggests that the intellectuals of statecraft might be compelled to face the challenge posed by the new actors' competing accounts on foreign and security policy issues.⁵⁰ The full implications of this development on policymaking remain to be seen.

48 Pinar Bilgin, "The 'peculiarity' of Turkey's position on EU-NATO military/security cooperation: A rejoinder to Missiroli," *Security Dialogue* 34:3 (2003): 343.

49 Gencer Özcan, "Türkiye Dış Politikasında Algılamalar, Karar Alma ve Oluşum Süreci" [Perceptions, decision-making and implementation in Turkey's foreign policy] in Faruk Sönmezoglu, ed., *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy) (Istanbul: Der, 2004): 857-66; and Ziya Öniş ve Umut Türem, "Business, globalisation and democracy: A comparative analysis of Turkish business associations," *Turkish Studies* 2:2 (2001): 94-120.

50 Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005): 175-201.